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Abstract—Recent changes in the fuel mix for electricity gener-
ation and, in particular, the increase in Gas-Fueled Power Plants
(GFPP), have created significant interdependencies between the
electrical power and natural gas transmission systems. However,
despite their physical and economic couplings, these networks
are still operated independently, with asynchronous market
mechanisms. This mode of operation may lead to significant
economic and reliability risks in congested environments as
revealed by the 2014 polar vortex event experienced by the north-
eastern United States. To mitigate these risks, while preserving
the current structure of the markets, this paper explores the
idea of introducing gas network awareness into the standard
unit commitment model. Under the assumption that the power
system operator has some (or full) knowledge of gas demand
forecast and the gas network, the paper proposes a tri-level
mathematical program where natural gas zonal prices are given
by the dual solutions of natural-gas flux conservation constraints
and commitment decisions are subject to bid-validity constraints
that ensure the economic viability of the committed GFPPs.
This tri-level program can be reformulated as a single-level
Mixed-Integer Second-Order Cone program which can then be
solved using a dedicated Benders decomposition. The approach
is validated on a case study for the Northeastern United States
[1] that can reproduce the gas and electricity price spikes
experienced during the early winter of 2014. The results on the
case study demonstrate that gas awareness in unit commitment
is instrumental in avoiding the peaks in electricity prices while
keeping the gas prices to reasonable levels.
I. INTRODUCTION
GAS-Fueled Power Plants (GFPPs) have become a sig-nificant part of the energy mix in the last decades,
primarily because of their operational flexibility and lower
environmental impacts. Although GFPPs have introduced in-
terdependencies between the natural gas and electrical power
systems, these networks are still operated independently, with
asynchronous market mechanisms. In particular, the unit com-
mitment decisions in the electrical power system take place
before the realization of natural gas spot prices, introducing
reliability risks and economic inefficiencies in congested en-
vironments. Indeed, the GFPPs may not be able to secure
gas at reasonable prices, introducing either reliability issues
or electricity gas spikes.
This undesirable outcome occurred in the Northeastern
United States during the early winter of 2014. Extremely low
temperatures induced an unusual coincident peak in electricity
and natural gas demand. On the one hand, it produced record-
high natural gas spot prices due to congestion. On the other
hand, high electricity loads led the electrical power system
operator to call for some emergency actions, which resulted
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in higher electricity prices [2]. Moreover, the power system
operator, valuing reliability the most, encouraged committed
GFPPs to buy natural gas at all costs without assurance of
cost recovery, further aggravating the economic cost [3]. It is
important to mention that the critical issue in this case was not
the gas supply, but rather congestion in the gas transmission
network. Moreover, a recent study [1] has shown that the cost
of expanding the gas and network infrastructures to avoid such
events would be prohibitive.
To address these interdependencies, a number of researchers
have studied how to incorporate the natural gas transmission
capabilities into the operational decisions of electrical power
systems. See, for instance, [4]–[13]. Other researchers have
also studied how to incorporate the economic coupling be-
tween these two infrastructures using new market mechanisms.
A new market framework with a joint ISO, using price-
or volume-based approaches, was investigated in [14], [15].
Instead of introducing one joint ISO, other researchers have
proposed a new market framework that assumes centralized
independent gas markets, synchronizes the electricity and gas
market days, and allows some information exchange between
some parties in the electricity and gas markets (e.g., market
operators or GFPPs) [16]–[21].
This paper takes a different approach that stays within
the current operating practices and does not introduce a new
market mechanism. Instead, the approach generalizes the unit
commitment model to capture the physical and economic
couplings and strive to ensure both physical feasibility and
economic viability. More precisely, the paper introduces the
Unit Commitment problem with Gas Network Awareness
(UCGNA) to schedule a set of generating units for the next
day while taking account the fuel delivery and the natural
gas prices that are propagated back by the natural gas system.
The UCGNA imposes bid-validity constraints on the GFPPs to
ensure their profitability and estimates the natural gas prices
for these constraints with the dual solutions associated with
the flux conservation constraints of the gas market.
The UCGNA is formulated as a tri-level mathematical
program and assumes that the power system operator has
partial (or full) knowledge on gas demand forecast and gas
network. When the power system is modeled with its DC
approximation and the gas network with the second-order cone
program from [22] to model its steady-state physics, the tri-
level mathematical program can be reformulated as a single-
level Mixed-Integer Second-Order Cone Program (MISOCP)
through strong duality of the innermost problem. The resulting
MISOCP can then be solved using a dedicated Benders
decomposition recently proposed in [23].
The key contributions of this paper are threefold. First,
it proposes the first unit commitment model (UCGNA) that
incorporates both the physical and economic couplings of elec-
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trical power and natural gas transmission systems and can be
used within current operating practices. Second, it proposes a
MISOCP that captures the UCGNA and can be solved through
Benders decomposition. Finally, it demonstrates the potential
of the approach on a detailed case study that replicates the
behavior of the 2014 polar vortex event on the Northeastern
United States. In particular, the paper shows that, on the
case study, the UCGNA avoids the electricity price peaks
and keeping the total gas costs reasonable, contrary to current
practice, even for highly congested electrical and gas networks.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
formalizes the UCGNA and Section III presents the MISOCP.
Section IV briefly reviews the solution methods for the MIS-
OCP. Section V describes the test cases. Lastly, Section VI
analyzes the behavior of the model on the case study and
Section VII concludes the paper.
II. UNIT COMMITMENT WITH GAS AWARENESS
This section specifies the UCGNA, including its electricity
system, its natural gas network, and their physical and eco-
nomic couplings. The electricity transmission grid is repre-
sented by an undirected graph Ge = (N , E) and the natural
gas transmission system by a directed graph Gg = (V,A).
Boldface letters represent vectors of variables, [a, b]Z denotes
the set of integers in interval [a, b], and [n] denotes the set
{1, · · · , n} for some integer n ≥ 1. The letter T denotes the
set of time periods {0, 1, · · · , T}.
A. The Electricity Transmission System
In the United States, Unit Commitment (UC) and Economic
Dispatch (ED) problems are solved daily to determine the
hourly operating schedule of generating units for the next
day from bids submitted by market participants. Tables I and
II summarize the parameters and variables of the UC/ED
problems. With these notations, the UC model is specified in
Figure 1: It is standard but is presented as a bi-level program to
make the UCGNA formulations more intuitive subsequently.
The objective function of the upper level problem (Equa-
tions (1a) - (1h)) includes the no-load costs, the start-up costs,
and the costs of the selected supply bids of each electrical
power generating units. Equation (1b) computes the start-up
cost ru,t of a generator u for time period t based on how long
u has been offline. The expression uu,t −
∑h
n=1 uu,t−n is
one when generator u becomes online after it has been turned
off for h time periods. Equation (1c) states the nonnegativity
requirement on ru,t. Equation (1d) specifies the initial on-
off status of each generator. The minimum-up and -down
constraints are specified in Equations (1e) and (1f) respec-
tively. The relationship between the variables for the on-off,
start-up, and shut-down statuses of each generator is stated in
Equation (1g). The binary requirements for logical variables
v+u,t, v
−
u,t, uu,t are specified in Equation (1h).
Based on the commitment decisions, the lower-level prob-
lem (i.e., Equations (1j) - (1u)) decides the hourly operating
schedule of each committed generators in order to minimize
the system production costs. Equation (1k) states the flow
conservation constraints for real power at each bus, using eh
TABLE I
PARAMETERS OF THE ELECTRICITY SYSTEM.
Ge = (N , E) Undirected graph where N is a set of buses
indexed by i = 1, · · · , N and E is a set of lines
indexed with e = 1, · · · , E
U Set of generators, indexed by u = 1, · · · , U
Ug ⊆ U Set of GFPPs
U(i) ⊆ U Set of generators located at i ∈ N
Bu Set of supply bids submitted by u ∈ U , indexed
by b = 1, · · · , Bu
βb Bid price of b ∈ Bu
sb Amount of real power generation of b ∈ Bu
p
u
, pu Minimum/maximum real power generation of
u ∈ U
Ru, Ru Ramp-down/-up rate of u ∈ U
cu No-load cost of u ∈ U
Ψu Set of counts of time periods with distinct start-up
costs of u indexed by h
Cu,h Start-up cost of u ∈ U when u is turned on after it
has been offline for some time ∈ [Ψu,h,Ψu,h+1]
uu,0, pu,0 Initial on-off status/real power generation of u ∈U
τu, τu Minimum-down/-up time of u ∈ U
τu,0, τu,0 The time that generator u ∈ U has to be inac-
tive/active from t = 0
be Line susceptance of e ∈ E
fe Real power limit of e ∈ E
(dei,t)i∈N Electricity load profile during t ∈ T
∆e Maximum voltage angle difference between two
end-points of e ∈ E
θi, θi Minimum/maximum voltage angle at i ∈ N
TABLE II
VARIABLES OF THE ELECTRICITY SYSTEM.
Binary variables
uu,t 1 if u ∈ U is on during t ∈ T , 0 otherwise
v+u,t 1 if u ∈ U becomes online during t ∈ T , 0 otherwise
v−u,t 1 if u ∈ U becomes offline during t ∈ T , 0 otherwise
Continuous variables
seb,t Real power generation from b ∈ Bu of u ∈ U during t ∈ T
pu,t Real power generation of u ∈ U during t ∈ T
fe,t Real power flow on e ∈ E during t ∈ T
ru,t Start-up cost of u ∈ U during t ∈ T
θi,t Voltage angle on i ∈ N during t ∈ T
and et to represent the head and tail of e ∈ E . Equation (1l)
states that the total real power generation of a generator u
is equal to the production of its selected bids. Equation (1m)
constrains the power generation seb,t from bid b ∈ Bu to be no
more than the submitted amount s¯b. Equation (1n) enforces
the bound on the real power generation of each generator.
Equation (1o) specifies the initial generation amount of each
generator, and Equations (1p) and (1q) state the ramp-up and
-down constraints of each generator. Equation (1r) captures the
DC approximation of the power flow equations and Equation
(1s) specifies the thermal limit on each line. Equations (1t) and
(1u) state the voltage angle bounds on each bus and the bounds
on the angle difference of two adjacent buses respectively.
B. The Natural Gas Transmission System
Tables III and IV specify the parameters and variables of
the steady-state natural gas model, which is given in Figure
2. The modeling is similar to those in [1], [22], [24] and uses
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min
∑
t∈[T ]
∑
u∈U
(cuuu,t + ru,t +
∑
b∈Bu
βbs
e
b,t) (1a)
s.t. ru,t ≥ Cu,h(uu,t −
∑
n∈[h]
uu,t−n),
∀h ∈ Ψs, u ∈ U , t ∈ [T ], (1b)
ru,t ≥ 0, ∀u ∈ U , t ∈ [T ], (1c)
uu,t = uu,0, ∀u ∈ U , t ∈ [0, τu,0 + τu,0]Z, (1d)∑
t′∈[t−τu+1,t]Z
v+u,t′ ≤ uu,t,
∀u ∈ U , t ∈ [max{τu, τu,0 + 1}, T ]Z, (1e)∑
t′∈[t−τu+1,t]Z
v+u,t′ ≤ 1− uu,t−τu ,
∀u ∈ U , t ∈ [max{τu, τu,0 + 1}, T ]Z, (1f)
v+u,t − v−u,t = uu,t − uu,t−1, ∀u ∈ U , t ∈ [T ], (1g)
v+u,t, v
−
u,t, uu,t ∈ {0, 1},∀u ∈ U , t ∈ [T ], (1h)
se = argmin Q(u,v+,v−), (1i)
where Q(u,v+,v−) denotes the ED problem specified as follows:
min
∑
t∈[T ]
∑
u∈U
(∑
b∈Bu
βbs
e
b,t
)
(1j)
s.t.
∑
u∈U(i)
pu,t − dei,t =
∑
e∈E:et=i
fe,t −
∑
e∈E:eh=i
fe,t,
∀i ∈ N , t ∈ [T ], (1k)
pu,t =
∑
b∈Bu
seb,t ∀u ∈ U , t ∈ [T ], (1l)
0 ≤ seb,t ≤ sb, ∀b ∈ Bu, u ∈ U , t ∈ [T ], (1m)
p
u
uu,t ≤ pu,t ≤ puuu,t, ∀u ∈ U , t ∈ [T ], (1n)
pu,0 = pu,0, ∀u ∈ U , (1o)
pu,t − pu,t−1 ≤ Ruuu,t−1 + puv+u,t, ∀u ∈ U , t ∈ [T ], (1p)
pu,t−1 − pu,t ≤ Ruuu,t−1 + puv
−
u,t, ∀u ∈ U , t ∈ [T ], (1q)
fe,t = −be(θeh,t − θet,t), ∀e ∈ E , t ∈ [T ], (1r)
− fe ≤ fe,t ≤ fe, ∀e ∈ E , t ∈ [T ], (1s)
θi ≤ θi,t ≤ θi, ∀i ∈ N , t ∈ [T ], (1t)
−∆e ≤ θeh,t − θet,t ≤ ∆e ∀e ∈ E , t ∈ [T ]. (1u)
Fig. 1. The Unit Commitment and Economic Dispatch Models.
TABLE III
PARAMETERS OF THE GAS SYSTEM
Gg = (V,A) Directed graph representing a natural gas trans-
mission network, where V is a set of junctions,
indexed with j = 1, · · · , V , and A ⊆ V × V is a
set of connections, indexed with a = 1, · · · , A
Ac ⊆ A Set of compressors
Av ⊆ A Set of control valves
κj Cost of demand shedding at j ∈ V
(dgj,t)j∈V Gas demand profile during t ∈ T
sgj , s
g
j Lower/Upper limit on natural gas supply at j ∈ V
cj(·) Cost function for gas supply at j ∈ V
Wa Pipeline resistance (Weymouth) factor of a ∈ A
pij , pij Minimum/maximum squared pressure at j ∈ V
αca, α
c
a Lower/upper compression ratio of a ∈ Ac
αva, α
v
a Lower/upper control ratio of a ∈ Av
TABLE IV
VARIABLES OF THE GAS SYSTEM
sgk,t Amount of gas supplied by k ∈ K during t ∈ T
pij,t Pressure squared at j ∈ V during t ∈ T
φa,t Gas flow on a ∈ A during t ∈ T
lj,t Satisfied gas demand at j ∈ V during t ∈ T
qj,t Shedded gas demand at j ∈ V during t ∈ T
γj,t Total amount of gas consumed by the GFPP located at j ∈
N ∩ V during t ∈ T
min
∑
t∈[T ]
∑
j∈V
(
∑
s∈Sj
cj,ss
g
s,t + κjqj,t) (2a)
s.t. sgj,t − lj,t − γj,t =
∑
a∈A:at=j
φa,t −
∑
a∈A:ah=j
φa,t,
∀j ∈ V, t ∈ [T ], (2b)
lj,t = d
g
j,t − qj,t, ∀j ∈ V, t ∈ [T ], (2c)
0 ≤ qj,t ≤ dgj,t, ∀j ∈ V, t ∈ [T ], (2d)
φa,t ≥ 0,∀a ∈ A, t ∈ [T ], (2e)
sgj ≤ sgj,t ≤ sgj ,∀j ∈ V, t ∈ [T ], (2f)
αcapiah,t ≤ piat,t ≤ αcapiah,t, ∀a ∈ Ac, t ∈ [T ], (2g)
αvapiah,t ≤ piat,t ≤ αvapiah,t, ∀a ∈ Av, t ∈ [T ], (2h)
piah,t − piat,t = Waφ2a,t, ∀a ∈ A \ (Av ∪ Ac), t ∈ [T ], (2i)
pij ≤ pij,t ≤ pij , ∀j ∈ V, t ∈ [T ] (2j)
sgj,t =
∑
s∈Sj
sgs,t (2k)
Fig. 2. The Natural Gas Transmission Model.
the Weymouth equation to capture the relationship between
pressures and flux. The flux conservation constraint is given
in Equation (2b), where ah and at represent the head and tail
of a ∈ A. Equation (2c) determines the demand served at each
junction: It captures the amount of gas load shedding which
must be nonnegative and cannot exceed the demand at the
corresponding junction (Equation (2d)). The model assumes
that gas flow directions are predetermined and Equation (2e)
enforces the sign of gas flow variables, i.e., it constrains φa,t
to be nonnegative. Equation (2f) specifies the upper and lower
limits of natural gas supplies. The change in pressure through
compressors and control valves are formulated in Equations
(2g) and (2h) and the model use a single compressor machine
approximation as in prior work. The steady-state physics of gas
flows is formulated with the Weymouth equation in Equation
(2i). Equation (2j) states the bounds on nodal pressures.
Equation (2i) can be convexified using the second-order cone
relaxation from [24]: piah,t − piat,t ≥Waφ2a,t. This relaxation
is very tight [24].
When the gas system is not congested, the price of natural
gas is relatively stable. However, during congestion and when
some loads are being shedded, natural gas prices increase
sharply. The cost of gas in the objective function captures this
behavior: For a junction j, it is specified with an almost-linear
piecewise linear function for production and a high penalty
cost κj for gas shedding. To be specific, let Sj be a set of
non-overlapping intervals covering [0, sgj ], each with a distinct
slope cj,s satisfying cj,s ≤ cj,s+1 whenever s, s + 1 ∈ Sj .
Define an auxiliary nonnegative variable sgs,t that represents
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TABLE V
PARAMETERS FOR THE ELECTRICITY AND GAS COUPLING.
{Hu,i}i=0,1,2 Coefficients of the heat rate curve of u ∈ Ug
αu Maximum allowable percentage of the expense on
natural gas over its marginal bid price for u ∈ Ug
K Set of pricing zones, indexed with k = 1, · · · ,K
V(k) Set of junctions that belong to k ∈ K
TABLE VI
VARIABLES FOR THE ELECTRICITY AND GAS COUPLING.
wb,t 1 if b ∈ Bu of u ∈ U is selected during t ∈ T , 0 otherwise
ρu,t Price of marginally selected bid of u ∈ Ug during t ∈ T
ψk,t Zonal price of natural gas in k ∈ K during t ∈ T
the amount of gas supply from s ∈ Sj at time t. The objective
function is then stated as
∑
t∈[T ]
∑
j∈V
(
∑
s∈Sj
cj,ss
g
s,t + κjqj,t).
The model also includes constraint (2k) to link the gas variable
at junction j with the auxiliary variables.
C. Physical and Economic Couplings
GFPPs are the physical and economic interface between the
electrical power and gas networks. This section first describes
the resulting coupling constraints before describing how the
natural gas zonal prices are computed. Tables V and VI
describe the parameters for the coupling.
The physical couplings between Ge and Gg can be formu-
lated as follows (t ∈ [T ], j ∈ N ∩ V):
γj,t =
∑
u∈U(i)∩Ug
Hu,2p
2
u,t +Hu,1pu,t +Hu,0. (3)
The real power generation p of a GFPP induces a demand γ in
the natural gas system. Equation (3) specifies the relationship
between the real power generation of a GFPP and the amount
of natural gas needed for the generation. In the equation, this
relationship is approximated by a quadratic heat-rate curve,
whose coefficients are given as Hu. The equation can be
convexified like the Weymouth equation.
Since the level of power generation of the GFPPs determines
the load in the gas system, the physical coupling also affects
the natural gas prices. The price formation of natural gas, in
turn, governs the profitability of GFPPs, which submit bids
before the realization of gas prices. To capture these economic
realities, the model introduces binary variables of the form
wb,t ∈ {0, 1} for each bid b of a GFPP: Variable wb,t indicates
whether bid b is selected during time period t. Equation (1l)
is then replaced by the following constraints (for all t ∈ [T ]):
ρu,t =
∑
b∈[Bu−1]
βb(wb,t − wb+1,t) + βBuwBu,t,∀u ∈ Ug,
(4a)
0 ≤ seb,t ≤ sb,∀b ∈ Bu, u ∈ U \ Ug, (4b)
0 ≤ seb,t ≤ sbwb,t,∀b ∈ Bu, u ∈ Ug (4c)
wb,t ≤ uu,t,∀b ∈ Bu, u ∈ Ug, (4d)
sbwb+1,t ≤ sb,t,∀b ∈ [1, Bu − 1]Z, u ∈ Ug. (4e)
Equations (4b) and (4c) are bound constraints for the bids
submitted by the non-GFPPs and GFPPs respectively. Equation
(4c) ensures that the indicator variable wb,t is one whenever
bid b is used for time period t (i.e., seb,t > 0). Equation (4d)
states that the bid of a generator can be selected only when
it is committed and Equation (4e) ensures that the (b + 1)th
bid is selected only if the bid b is fully used. Accordingly,
Equation (4a) states that ρu,t is the maximum/marginal bid
price of GFPP u ∈ Ug among its currently selected bids.
The economic coupling between the electricity and gas
networks is enforced by bid-validity constraints that ensure
that the marginal costs of producing electricity by GFPPs are
lower than their marginal bid prices. Although the natural
gas system is operated in a decentralized manner, the zonal
price of natural gas ψ can be modeled as a function g of the
market supply and demand, i.e., as a function of the binary
and continuous variables of Problems (1) and (2), which are
denoted by z and x. Under this assumption, the bid validity
constraints can be expressed as follows (for all t ∈ [T ]):
ψ = g(z, x), (5a)
αuρu,t +M(1− uu,t) ≥ [2pu,tHu,2 +Hu,1]ψk,t,
∀k ∈ K, i ∈ V(k), u ∈ U(i) ∩ Ug. (5b)
They capture the fact that, when the realized natural gas price
[2pu,tHu,2 +Hu,1]ψk,t
for generating one additional unit of real power by GFPP u
is greater than its marginal bid price ρu,t, GFPP u is not
profitable. This situation arises because GFPP u submits its
bids before the realization of ψ. The bid validity constraint
is expressed in Equation (5b) and ensures that only profitable
GFPPs are committed. The bid validity constraints use the
realized zonal gas prices from Equation (5a) and M denotes a
big-M value set to the maximum natural gas price (e.g., $200
per mmBtu) multiplied by [2puHu,2 +Hu,1].
It remains to specify how to compute the zonal gas prices,
i.e., the function g in Equation (5a). The UCGNA assumes
that the nodal natural gas price at each junction j is given by
the marginal cost of supplying natural gas at j. This marginal
cost is the dual solution associated with the corresponding flux
conservation constraint in Problem (2). The zonal natural gas
prices ψ are then computed by averaging the nodal natural
gas prices of a subset of junctions in the zone. Therefore, the
zonal natural gas price ψ are given by linear functions of the
dual solution to Problem (2).
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Note that, by construction, the natural gas zonal prices ψ
under normal operating conditions are given by the almost
linear part of objective (2a). However, when the gas network is
congested and load needs to be shed, the zonal prices increase
sharply due to the high penalty cost κj . As a result, the
resulting model closely captures the behavior of the market
during the 2014 polar vortex. Note also that the model does
not shed the demand of the GFPPs. The model assumes that
GFPPs buy natural gas at any cost to meet its commitment
obligation. Once again, this captures the 2014 Polar Vortex
situation where GFPPs were encouraged to buy the natural
gas from the spot market at any cost for the sake of the power
system reliability [3].
III. REFORMULATION OF THE UCGNA
This section shows how the UCGNA can be expressed as a
MISOCP. Let variable subscripts p and g respectively denote
the power and the gas systems. Let zp and xp respectively
denote the vector of binary and continuous variables of the
power system (i.e., Problem (1)) and let xg be the vector of
continuous variables of the gas system (i.e., Problem (2)). The
UCGNA can be stated as a trilevel program:
min
xp≥0,yg
zp∈{0,1}m
cTp xp + h
Tzp (6a)
s.t. zp ∈ Z, (6b)
(xp,yg) = argmin
xp≥0,yg
cTp xp
s.t. Axp +Bzp ≥ b,
yg ∈ Dual sol. of (7),
(6c)
Eyg +Mzp ≥ h (6d)
where Z denotes the feasible region of the unit commitment
problem (i.e., Equations (1b)-(1h)), the third level problem is
defined as
min
xg∈K
cTg xg : Dpxp +Dgxg ≥ d, (7)
and K is the proper cone denoting the domain of xg .
The first-level problem (i.e., Equations (6a) and (6b)) formu-
lates the unit-commitment problem (i.e., Equations (1a)-(1h)
and Equation (4)). The unit-commitment decisions zp from
the first-level problem are then plugged into the second-level
problem, which formulates the economic dispatch problem
(i.e., Equations (1j)-(1u)) and decides the hourly operating
schedule of committed generating units. Then, the third-
level problem (i.e., Problem (7)) formulates the natural gas
problem (i.e., Problem (2) and Equation (3)) and determines
the resulting nodal prices for natural gas based on the dual
solution yg of the economic dispatch decisions.
Equations (6a), (6b), and (6c) capture the current operating
practice of the power system. The first level captures the
commitment decisions that are taken first without consid-
eration of the gas network. The second and third levels
implement a Stackelberg game, where the dispatch decisions
of the electricity system are followed by those of the natural
gas network. The novelty in the UCNGA is the bid-validity
constraint (6d), which corresponds to Equation (5b): It ensures
that only profitable GFPPs are selected in the first level and
uses the dual variables of the third-level problem to do so,
allowing the unit-commitment problem to anticipate the zonal
prices of natural gas.
The following theorem, whose proof is in Appendix A,
shows that the tri-level problem can be reformulated as a
single-level mathematical program. The proof uses strong
duality on the third-level problem and a lexicographic opti-
mization to merge the second and third levels.
Theorem 1: Problem (6) can be asymptotically approxi-
mated by the following mathematical program:
min αhTzp + αc
T
p xp + (1− α)cTg xg (8a)
s.t. zp ∈ Z, (8b)
Axp +Bzp ≥ b, (8c)
Dpxp +Dgxg ≥ d, (8d)
yTp (b−Bzp) + yTg d ≥ αcTp xp + (1− α)cTg xg, (8e)
yTgDg K∗ (1− α)cTg , (8f)
yTpA+ y
T
gDp ≤ αcTp , (8g)
1
1− αEyg +Mzp ≥ h, (8h)
xp ≥ 0,xg ∈ K,yp ≥ 0,yg ≥ 0, (8i)
zp ∈ {0, 1}m, (8j)
for some α ∈ (0, 1). Moreover, when α → 1, the optimal
solution of Problem (8) converges to the optimal solution of
Problem (6).
Observe that Problem (8) has a bilinear term of yTpBzp in
Equation (8e). Assuming that y has an upper bound of y, this
term can be rewritten using an exact McCormick relaxation to
produce a MISOCP.
Remark 1: Problem (8) is best viewed as a “standard” MIS-
OCP to which a constraint on the dual variables of its inner-
continuous problem has been added. The “standard” MISOCP
optimizes the joint electricity and natural gas problem
min αhTzp + αc
T
p xp + (1− α)cTg xg (9a)
s.t. zp ∈ Z, (9b)
Axp +Bzp ≥ b, (9c)
Dpxp +Dgxg ≥ d, (9d)
xp ≥ 0,xg ∈ K,zp ∈ {0, 1}m, (9e)
and the additional constraints
1
1− αEyg +Mzp ≥ h.
on the dual variables (yp, yg) of its inner continuous problem
capture the bid validity.
IV. SOLUTION APPROACH
This section briefly sketches how the MISOCP is solved.
Problem (8) can be reformulated as
min
zp∈Bn
αhTzp + f(zp) (10a)
s.t. zp ∈ Z. (10b)
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where
f(zp) = minαc
T
p xp + (1− α)cTg xg (11a)
s.t. Axp +Bzp ≥ b, (11b)
Dpxp +Dgxg ≥ d, (11c)
yTp (b−Bzp) + yTg d ≥ αcTp xp + (1− α)cTg xg, (11d)
yTgDg K∗ (1− α)cTg , (11e)
yTpA+ y
T
gDp ≤ αcTp , (11f)
1
1− αEyg +Mzp ≥ h, (11g)
xp ≥ 0,xg ∈ K,yp ≥ 0,yg ≥ 0. (11h)
The implementation applies a Benders decomposition on this
formulation to solve Problem (8). Moreover, the dual of
Problem (11) has a special structure that can be exploited by
the dedicated Benders decomposition from [23]. The idea is to
decompose the dual of Problem (11) into two more tractable
problems. The extreme points and rays of these subproblems
can be used to find the (feasibility and optimality) Benders
cuts of Problem (11). The solution method also uses the
acceleration schemes from [25], [26] which normalize the rays
yˆ and perturb zˆp. The solution method also obtains feasible
solutions periodically (e.g., every 30 iterations) heuristically
by turning off violated generators. Finally, the solution method
applies a preprocessing step to eliminate some invalid bids. It
exploits the fact that the natural gas prices without the GFPP
load gives a lower bound on the natural gas zonal prices.
Therefore, the implementation solves Problem (2) with no
GFPPs, i.e., γj,t = 0 for all j ∈ V, t ∈ [1, T ]Z. Those bids
violating the bid-validity constraint with regard to these zonal
prices are not considered further.
V. DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA SETS
The UCGNA model is evaluated on the gas-grid test system
from [1], which is representative of the natural gas and electric
power systems in the Northeastern United States. This test
system is composed of the IEEE 36-bus NPCC electric power
system [27] and a multi-company gas transmission network
covering the Pennsylvania-To-Northeast New England area in
the United States [1]. The data for the test system can be found
online at https://github.com/lanl-ansi/GasGridModels.jl.
The test system consists of 91 generators of various types
(e.g., hydro, gas-fueled, coal-fired, nuclear, etc.). The unit-
commitment data for these generators (e.g., generator offer
curves including start-up and no-load costs and operational
parameters such as minimum run time) was obtained from
the RTO unit commitment test system [28]. Each generator in
the gas-grid test system is assigned the unit commitment data
adapted to its fuel-type and megawatt capacity.
The gas-grid test case consists of two natural gas pricing
zones: Transco Zone 6 non NY and Transco Leidy Line. The
Transco Leidy Line represents the natural gas prices in the
Marcellus Shale production area, which has a wealth of natural
gas. On the other hand, the Transco Zone 6 non NY represents
the natural gas prices near consumption points. Therefore, a
large difference in prices between these two pricing zones
implies a scarcity of transmission capacities between these
two points. During normal operations, the average natural gas
prices in the Transco Zone 6 non NY and the Leidy Line are
around $3/mmBtu and $1.5/mmBtu respectively. The slopes
cj,s at junction j ∈ V (see Section (II-B)) are chosen to be
around these numbers. The penality cost for load shedding κaj
is set as $130/mmBtu for all junctions. The results are given
for a single time-period (i.e., T = 1).
VI. CASE STUDY
This section analyzes, under various operating conditions,
the behavior of the UCGNA on the realistic test system
described in Section V. The results are compared with current
practices. The case study varies the level of stress on both
the electrical power and gas systems. For the electrical power
system, the load is uniformly increased by 30% and 60%. For
the gas system, the load is uniformly increased by 10% up to
130%. Parameters ηp and ηg respectively represent the stress
level imposed on the electrical power and gas systems. In the
results, (A) denotes existing practices and (B) the UCGNA
model. Solutions for (B) are obtained with a wall-clock time
limit of 1 hour, while solutions for (A) is obtained by the
following procedure:
(i) Solve the power model (i.e., Problem (1));
(ii) Retrieve the demand of GFPPs using Equation (3) and
plug it into the gas model (i.e., Problem (2));
(iii) Solve the gas model and compute the natural gas zonal
prices using the dual values associated with the flux
conservation constraints;
(iv) Based on the zonal prices, determine the set of GFPPs
violating the bid-validity constraint (i.e., Equation (5b))
and compute the loss of such GFPPs by multiplying
the violation, i.e., the difference between the marginal
gas price and the marginal bid price, with the scheduled
amount of power generation.
The behaviors of (A) and (B) in the normal, stressed, and
highly-stressed power systems are compared in Figures 3, 4,
and 5 respectively. In each figure, (a) and (c) display the
system costs and natural gas prices of (A), and (b) and (d)
display those of (B). More precisely, (a) and (b) present the
total cost breakdown in terms of the cost of electrical power
system, the cost of the gas system, and the economic loss from
invalid bids. (c) and (d) depict the natural gas zonal prices in
each pricing zone.1
Figures 3a and 3c show that the gas system cost gradually
increases as ηg increases up to 1.7, then it grows rapidly from
ηg = 1.8 on. The rapid increase is due to load shedding (see
Section II-B) and leads to natural gas price spikes in Transco
Zone 6 non NY. The large difference between the prices in
Zone 6 and Leidy Line indicates that the load shedding occurs
due to the lack of transmission capacity between these two
points, not because of a lack of gas supply. Due to the gas price
spike in Transco Zone 6 non NY, some bids of GFPPs become
invalid and incur some losses, which increases the total cost.
On the other hand, for (B), the electrical power system cost is
1Note that, as ηg increases, the total cost of (A) always increases, while
the cost of (B) temporarily decreases sometimes. This is due to the presense
of optimality gaps for some hard instances.
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(a) System costs (A). (b) System costs (B).
(c) Natural gas prices (A). (d) Natural gas prices (B).
Fig. 3. Results for the Normal Operating Conditions of the Electrical Power
System (ηp = 1).
(a) System costs (A). (b) System costs (B).
(c) Natural gas prices (A). (d) Natural gas prices (B).
Fig. 4. Results for the Stressed Electrical Power System (ηp = 1.3).
slightly higher than for (A), but it does not incur any economic
loss from invalid bids and the overall cost is lower. Observe
also that model (A) captures the same behavior as in the 2014
polar vortex. Additionally, observe that the gas price in the
Zone 6 region is also exhibiting sharp increases in model (B).
However, this peak has significantly less impact for (B) given
the different commitment decisions.
The differences in behavior between systems (A) and (B)
become clearer as the load increases in the electrical power
system. For the stressed power system, displayed in Figure 4,
the difference between the total cost of (A) and (B) becomes
very large: There are many invalid bids for (A), which puts
the reliability of the power system at high risk and induces an
electricity price peak. The price of gas and the economic losses
both increase significantly in (A) and the increases start at
stress level 1.5 for the gas network. In contrast, (B) maintains
(a) System costs (A). (b) System costs (B).
(c) Natural gas prices (A). (d) Natural gas prices (B).
Fig. 5. Results for the Highly-Stressed Electrical Power System (ηp = 1.6).
TABLE VII
STATISTICS ON COMMITTED GENERATORS FOR THE STRESSED
ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM (ηp = 1.6): THE FIRST 7 COLUMNS
DISPLAY THE NUMBER OF COMMITTED GENERATORS WITH RESPECT TO
ITS FUEL TYPE, WHERE (O) OIL, (C) COAL, (G) GAS, (H) HYDRO, (R)
REFUSE, (N) NUCLEAR, (E) OTHERS, AND THE LAST TWO COLUMNS
SHOW THE NUMBER OF COMMITTED GFPPS IN EACH PRICING ZONE,
WHERE (T) TRANSCO ZONE 6 NON NY AND (L) TRANSCO LEIDY LINE.
ηg (O) (C) (G) (H) (R) (N) (E) (T) (L)
1.0 7 6 12 11 0 12 3 8 4
1.6 8 6 10 11 0 13 3 6 4
2.3 9 6 9 11 0 13 3 4 4
a reliable operation independently of the stress imposed on
the natural gas system. The price of gas increases obviously
but less than in (A) and the cost of the power system remains
stable. The peak in gas price only starts at stress level 1.7,
showing that (B) delays the impact of congestion in the gas
networks by making better commitment decisions.
Figure 5 shows the benefits of (B) over (A) become even
more substantial when both systems are highly stressed. Ob-
serve that the cost of the electrical power system remains
stable once again in (B) and that the cost of the gas network
increases reasonably. In contrast, Model (A) exhibits signifi-
cant increases in gas prices and economic cost from invalid
bids. These results indicate that bringing gas awareness in unit
commitment brings significant benefits in congested networks.
By choosing commitment decisions that ensure bid validity,
the UCGNA brings substantial cost and reliability benefits for
congested situations like the 2014 polar vortex.
The great cost and reliability benefits of (B) are owing to
better commitment decisions that anticipate the future state
of the gas system. Table VII summarizes some statistics on
committed generators under the highly stressed power system.
As the gas load increases, some of the GFPPs in (T) are
no longer committed and the lost generation is replaced by
generators of different types or GFPPs with reasonable bid
prices. More specifically, Figure 6 shows the commitment
decision of (A) and (B) for (ηp, ηg) = (1.6,2.3). The numbers
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(a) Number of committed GFPPs (A). (b) Number of committed non-GFPPs (A).
(c) Number of committed GFPPs (B). (d) Number of committed non-GFPPs (B).
Fig. 6. Results for the Highly-Stressed Condition (ηp, ηg) = (1.6,2.3).
TABLE VIII
SOLUTION STATISTICS FOR (B).
ηg
ηp 1 1.3 1.6
(i) (ii) (i) (ii) (i) (ii)
1 255301.0 0.0 332123.0 0.0 415315.0 0.0
1.1 256502.0 0.0 333333.0 0.0 416530.0 0.0
1.2 257706.0 0.0 334548.0 0.0 417759.0 0.0
1.3 258915.0 0.0 335776.0 0.0 419015.0 0.0
1.4 260132.0 0.0 337036.0 0.0 420548.0 0.0
1.5 261364.0 0.0 338564.0 0.0 423466.0 0.0
1.6 262613.0 0.0 342066.0 0.3 439254.0 2.1
1.7 264019.0 0.0 361089.0 3.5 463746.0 2.0
1.8 278679.0 1.8 379532.0 3.2 489011.0 6.2
1.9 296251.0 1.3 408407.0 3.3 524533.0 7.4
2 317619.0 0.0 430415.0 4.2 519026.0 3.7
2.1 329801.0 0.0 460127.0 4.3 596449.0 5.0
2.2 358828.0 0.0 497952.0 4.0 635128.0 5.0
2.3 405022.0 0.0 537874.0 0.0 672876.0 0.0
in black in Figures 6a and 6c report the number of committed
GFPPs on the corresponding bus; Those in Figures 6b and
6d display the number of committed non-GFPPs. In Figure
6a, the numbers in red on the bottom right corner of some
buses represent the number of committed GFPPs located at
the bus without bid validity. Most invalid GFPPs in Figure 6a
are turned off in Figure 6c and replaced by some non-GFPPs
as Figure 6d indicates.
Finally, Table VIII summarizes the objective value and the
optimality gap of (B) for each instance. For 16 out of 42
instances, the algorithm times out (wall-clock limit time of
1 hour) and it reports sub-optimal solutions whose optimality
gaps are presented in columns denoted by (ii). It is important to
stress however that even sub-optimal solutions to the UCGNA
bring significant benefits for gas-grid networks as shown
previously.
VII. CONCLUSION
The 2014 polar vortex showed how interdependencies be-
tween the electrical power and gas networks may induce
significant economic and/or reliability risks under heavy con-
gestion. This paper has demonstrated that these risks can be
effectively mitigated by making unit commitment decisions
informed by the physical and economic couplings of the
gas-grid network. The resulting Unit Commitment with Gas
Network Awareness (UCGNA) model builds upon the standard
unit commitment used in current practices but also reasons
about the feasibility of gas transmission feasibility and the
profitability of committed GFPPs. In particular, the UCGNA
introduces bid-validity constraints that ensure the economic
viability of committed GFPPs, whose marginal bid prices must
be higher than the marginal natural gas prices. The UCGNA
is a three-level model whose bid validity constraints operate
BYEON AND VAN HENTENRYCK: UNIT COMMITMENT WITH GAS NETWORK AWARENESS 9
on the dual variables of flux conservation constraints in the
gas network, which represent the marginal cost of gas for
producing a unit of electricity. It can be formulated as a Mixed-
Integer Second-Order Cone Program (MISOCP) and solved
using a dedicated Benders decomposition approach. The case
study, based on a modeling of the gas-grid network in the
North-East of the United States, shows that the UCGNA has
significant benefits compared to the existing operations: It is
capable to ensure valid bids even at highly-stressed levels,
while only increasing the cost of gas and electricity in a
reasonable way. In contrast, the existing operating practices
induce significant economic losses and gas price increases.
Future research will be devoted to further improve the
solution techniques to solve the UCGNA and, in particular,
the use of cut bundling and Pareto-optimal cuts.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof: By strong duality of the third-level optimization
in Problem (6), Problem (6c) is equivalent to:
(xp,yg) = argmin
xp≥0,yg
cTp xp (12a)
s.t. Axp +Bzp ≥ b, (12b)
yg = argmin
xg∈K,yg≥0
cTg xg
s.t. Dpxp +Dgxg ≥ d,
yTg (d−Dpxp) ≥ cTg xg,
yTgDg K∗ cg.
(12c)
where K∗ denotes the dual cone of K. The first and third
constraints of Problem (12c) state the primal and dual feasi-
bility of the third-level problem, while the second constraint
ensures their optimality.
Equation (12b) (i.e., the constraint of the upper level
problem of Problem (12)) does not involve the lower-level
variables (i.e., xg and yg of Problem (12c)), which means
the upper-level solution is not affected by the solutions to
the lower-level problem. Problem (12) can thus be solved in
two steps: (i) solve the upper-level problem and obtain x¯p,
(ii) solve the lower-level problem with xp fixed as x¯p and
obtain y¯g . Accordingly, Problem (12) can be expressed with a
Lexicographic function as follows:
(xp,yg) = argmin
xp≥0,xg∈K,yg≥0
< cTp xp, c
T
g xg > (13a)
s.t. Axp +Bzp ≥ b, (13b)
Dpxp +Dgxg ≥ d, (13c)
yTg (d−Dpxp) ≥ cTg xg, (13d)
yTgDg K∗ cg. (13e)
The optimal solution (x¯p, x¯g, y¯g) of Problem (13) satisfies the
following conditions:
x¯p = argmin
xp≥0,xg∈K
cTp xp (14a)
s.t. Axp ≥ b−Bzp, (14b)
Dpxp +Dgxg ≥ d. (14c)
(x¯g, y¯g) = argmin
xg∈K,yg≥0
cTg xg (15a)
s.t. Dgxg ≥ d−Dpx¯p, (15b)
yTg (d−Dpx¯p) ≥ cTg xg, (15c)
yTgDg K∗ cg. (15d)
Observe that any feasible (xˆg, yˆg) of Problem (15) is optimal.
By strong duality, (xˆg, yˆg) satisfies the following conditions:
xˆg = argmin
xg∈K
cTg xg (16a)
s.t. Dgxg ≥ d−Dpx¯p. (16b)
yˆg = argmax
yg≥0
yTg (d−Dpx¯p) (17a)
s.t. yTgDg K∗ cg. (17b)
Since Problem (16) is a relaxation of Problem (15) and xˆg ,
paired with yˆg , is feasible for Problem (15), (xˆg, yˆg) is optimal
to Problem (15). As a result, for α ∈ (0, 1), Problem (6) can
be approximated by
min αhTzp + αc
T
p xp + (1− α)cTg xg (18a)
s.t. zp ∈ Z, (18b)
(xp,xg,yg) = Primal & dual opt. sol. of (19), (18c)
1
1− αEyg +Mzp ≥ h, , (18d)
xp ≥ 0,xg ∈ K,yp ≥ 0,yg ≥ 0, (18e)
zp ∈ {0, 1}m. (18f)
where the low-level problem in Equation (18c) is
min
xp≥0,xg∈K
αcTp xp + (1− α)cTg xg (19a)
s.t. Axp +Bzp ≥ b, (19b)
Dpxp +Dgxg ≥ d. (19c)
Problem (19) is an approximation of Problem (13), where
yg is obtained by the dual solution associated with Equation
(19c). Hence, by strong duality of Problem (19), Problem (8)
is equivalent to Problem (18).
It remains to show that Problem (8) is indeed an asymptotic
approximation of Problem (6). Replacing yp with yp/α and yg
with yg/(1−α) in Problem (8) gives the following equivalent
problem:
min αhTzp + αc
T
p xp + (1− α)cTg xg (20a)
s.t. zp ∈ Z, (20b)
Axp +Bzp ≥ b, (20c)
Dpxp +Dgxg ≥ d, (20d)
yTp (b−Bzp)− cTp xp ≥
1− α
α
[
cTg xg − yTg d
]
, (20e)
yTgDg K∗ cTg , (20f)
yTpA+
1− α
α
yTgDp ≤ cTp , (20g)
Eyg +Mzp ≥ h, (20h)
xp ≥ 0,xg ∈ K,yp ≥ 0,yg ≥ 0, (20i)
zp ∈ {0, 1}m. (20j)
Let P (zˆp) and P̂ (zˆp) denote Problems (13) and (20) in
which the binary variables zp are fixed to some zˆp ∈ {0, 1}m.
Let (xˆp, xˆg, yˆp, yˆg) be the optimal solution of P̂ (zˆp). Note
that, as α→ 1, Equations (20e) and (20g) become as follows:
yTp (b−Bzˆp) ≥ cTp xp, (21a)
yTpA ≤ cTp , (21b)
which implies that yˆp and xˆp approximate the optimal primal
and dual solutions of Problem (14) when zp is fixed as zˆp.
This is because xˆp is feasible for (14) (by Equation (20c)), yˆp
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becomes feasible to the dual of Problem (14) as α approaches
1 (by Equation (21b)), and together they satisfy the strong
duality condition of Equation (21a) as α becomes closer to 1
(by Equation (21a)). Therefore, as α→ 1, (xˆp, yˆp) becomes a
feasible solutions of P (zˆp) and has the same optimal objective
value.
Moreover, combining Equations (20e) and (20g) gives
(Equation (20e))− xˆp × (Equation (20g))
→ yˆTp (b−Bzˆp −Axˆp) + 1− α
α
yˆTg (d−Dpxˆp) ≥ 1− α
α
cTg xˆg
→ yˆTg (d−Dpxˆp) ≥ cTg xˆg, (22a)
where the last derivation follows from Equation (20c) and
yg ≥ 0. Therefore, xˆg and yˆg are the optimal solutions of
Problem (15) when xp is fixed as xˆp (since its feasibility is
guaranteed by Equations (20d) and (20f), while the optimality
is guaranteed by Equation (22a)).
In summary, xˆp is an approximate solution of P (zˆp) that
becomes increasingly close to the optimal solution of Problem
P (zˆp) as α → 1, and yˆg is the exact response of the
follower with respect to xˆp for any α ∈ (0, 1). Therefore,
the approximation may sacrifice the leader’s optimality when
α is not large enough, but it always gives a feasible solution.
